With Russian forces intensifying their atrocities against Ukraine’s civilian population, including by deliberately bombing Mariupol’s Drama Theater with hundreds of people hiding inside, and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s impassioned plea to Congress for stronger US support, the Biden administration finds itself in a bind.

On the one hand, the White House seeks to prevent escalation that could prompt a reckless reaction from the cornered Russian dictator, Vladimir Putin. On the other, standing with Ukraine — and on the side of freedom, as President Joe Biden put it in his address Wednesday — requires doing far more than it has.

There was a dramatic contrast between the substance, the tone and the sense of urgency behind Zelensky’s speech and Biden’s droning, unimaginative remarks a few hours later. The latter, announcing an added $800 million worth of military aid to Ukraine, hardly rose to the occasion, either in style and delivery or in substance.

Style-wise, Biden regurgitated expressions of rhetorical support and solidarity with Ukraine, which may ring increasingly hollow to Ukrainian ears. Substantively, he added to the $1 billion commitment made last week by providing Ukrainians with more Stinger anti-aircraft systems, additional Javelins and other anti-armor weapons, 100 tactical drones, handguns and grenade launchers, ammunition, body armor and helmets and other equipment.

Yet this “new” package is simply a response to Congress’ authorization last week of up to $6.5 billion in military aid, leaving a question mark on the structure and timeline for the delivery of the remainder of the authorized assistance — and on whether it’s going to be enough for the purposes of winning this war.

The conflict is far from over and its outcome far from a foregone conclusion, notwithstanding Russian tactical and logistical failures and poor planning and the increased reports of successful counterattacks by Ukrainian forces. Especially if Mariupol falls, as seems likely, the most effective Russian forces out of Crimea will enjoy considerable freedom of action in southern Ukraine, either consolidating territorial gains along the coast of the Sea of Azov or strengthening the now-stalled offensive toward Odessa, a key Black Sea port.

Even if the anecdotal information suggesting some progress on the diplomatic front prove correct, it remains in the West’s interest that Zelensky’s hand in the negotiations is as strong as possible. Ukraine’s clout in the ceasefire talks grows in direct proportion to its dominance on the battlefield. As a result, any conciliatory noises from Moscow should be met in the West with a doubling down on our military support for Ukraine.

If the conflict is indeed a protracted one, the West must ensure that the flow of military basics included in the White House’s package Wednesday — handguns, ammunition, helmets and so forth — is a steady one. Both sides are burning quickly through their supplies; if we want Ukrainians to win, we must ensure their supplies are larger than the Russians’.

Finally, there is a tension between the overarching policy goal of defeating Putin and Biden’s efforts to avoid further Russian escalation, driven in part surely by understandable concerns over Russia’s tactical nuclear arsenal. Yet we are not really helping Ukraine unless we’re hurting the Kremlin and Russian forces — the two are opposite sides of the same coin.

The attempt to provide Ukraine with Polish MiG fighter jets, scrapped by the administration in spite of the idea’s embrace by Secretary of State Antony Blinken, shows the perils of preemptively surrendering to the diktats of what we believe will upset the Russians. Though no one wants a nuclear confrontation with Russia, most forms of military aid to Ukraine that would be effective would also constitute a form of escalation.

Consider the promise of the government of Slovakia, a country of 5 million, to supply Ukraine with its own long-range S-300 anti-aircraft missile systems — a bold but still prudent, calculated risk. The Pentagon should be scrambling similar Soviet-made weaponry across our Eastern European allies while offering our own capacities as a backstop to countries stepping forward. When such systems are unavailable, more creativity is needed to help Ukrainians operate state-of-the-art Western systems, either through training programs or by facilitating the use of Western contractors in Ukraine.

Will it upset Putin? For sure. Will it trigger a nuclear showdown in Eastern Europe? Unlikely.

In short, whether the president likes it or not, wars tend to upend domestic political dynamics. The administration will be judged both in the midterms and in 2024 not by whether it did the minimum necessary to help Ukraine and its embattled people while sticking with Biden’s campaign promise to keep the United States out of “forever wars” but whether it fully rose to the challenge of confronting Putin’s revanchism, which unchecked puts our entire system of alliances — and by extension our long-term ambition to contain China — at risk.

Here’s hoping Team Biden can choose wisely.

Dalibor Rohac is a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. Twitter: @DaliborRohac.