#Six obstacles to peace negotiations between Kyiv and Moscow

Why is there still no negotiated end to the war and why is there unlikely to be one in the near future? There are, at least, six circumstances that hinder a compromise between Kyiv and Moscow.

Obstacles 1 and 2: The constitutions of Ukraine and Russia

In March 2014, Russia formally annexed Crimea and, in September 2022, four south-eastern Ukrainian mainland regions. As a result, there are now five administrative units of Ukraine, to which the Ukrainian and Russian constitutions lay claim to. Neither of these constitutions can be changed easily. In fact, Ukraine will never relinquish its rightful territory. The prospect of a Russian reversal of the constitutional reforms of 2014 and 2022, that implemented the annexations, is politically less fantastic than Ukraine renouncing its temporarily occupied territories. Nevertheless, a Russian fulfillment of its obligations under international law — if and when such an intention arises in the Kremlin — will not be easy to implement and follow rather than precede the liberation of the occupied territories.

Obstacles 3 and 4: Two different hawkish camps

In Ukraine and Russia, there are two ethically distinct, but, in domestic political terms, significant groups strictly opposed to any territorial and political compromise with the enemy. A majority of Ukrainians want to defend their country’s territorial integrity and political sovereignty while Russian hawks want to either keep or increase the war booty. Due to the high blood toll that the war is taking in both countries, concessions to the other side would pose major domestic political challenges for both the Ukrainian and Russian governments. Even small compromises, as a result of hypothetical negotiations, would be branded as treason. Large sections of the population and entire parties would oppose them. They would make their voices heard and become politically and perhaps even physically active.

Obstacle 5: The Crimean challenge

For Ukraine, Crimea’s liberation is not only a matter of sovereignty, but also of strategy. While Kyiv needs the peninsula for securing the Ukrainian mainland, Moscow wants to keep Crimea to threaten it. Moreover, Crimea was and is the most popular territorial acquisition that Putin has presented to the Russian nation. This not only makes a Russian return of Crimea to Ukraine as a result of negotiations unlikely. It also creates a strategic dilemma for the Kremlin. Crimea is part of a larger economic and historical space that also includes large parts of southern mainland Ukraine. In a hypothetical Russian-Ukrainian negotiation on the currently occupied territories, it is therefore a question of all or nothing not only for Kyiv, but also for Moscow. A peace plan in which Russia partially accepts that Ukraine regains its currently occupied mainland territories but leaves Crimea behind as a consolation prize for Moscow, would be unacceptable not only for Kyiv, but also for the Kremlin. Crimea as an isolated exclave far away and difficult to reach from Russia would make neither economic nor strategic sense for Moscow.

Obstacle 6: East-Central European skepticism towards Moscow

The most important factor preventing Kyiv from premature negotiations with Moscow is its historical experience with Russia and the comparative interpretation of the current conflict. Ukrainian history, as well as the past of other East-Central European states, suggests that Russia will not abide by an agreement reached through diplomatic compromise rather than military victory. Independent Ukraine has signed hundreds of agreements with Russia over the last 30 years, most of which are now invalid. Ukrainians, as well as other nations and ethnicities of the former Tsarist and Soviet empires, have had many bitter experiences over the centuries with Russian imperialism which is today once again Moscow’s barely disguised foreign policy doctrine. These historical lessons advise Kyiv to wait for an — at least partial — Ukrainian victory before meaningful negotiations can begin.

Conclusions

At some point, negotiations may once again play a role in Russian-Ukrainian relations. However, it will be necessary to wait until the situation on the ground and in Moscow has changed sufficiently for talks to make sense for Kyiv. An agreement that is signed before Ukraine has at least gained a significant military advantage and a stronger negotiating position would be a farce. A resulting compromise will at best bring about a postponement and not an end to the armed conflict.

As soon as a meaningful agreement is signed between Kyiv and Moscow, its functioning must be ensured. In light of Russia’s behavior in the post-Soviet space over the past 30 years, securing future peace will only be possible with plausible deterrence against a renewed escalation. Provision of military support for Kyiv is therefore the right strategy in three respects: First, it will help to prepare for peace now. Second, it will enable a meaningful agreement between Kyiv and Moscow at a future date. And third, it will keep the peace intact afterwards.

Andreas Umland, PhD, is an analyst at the Stockholm Centre for East European Studies (SCEEUS) at the Swedish Institute of International Affairs (UI). The article summarizes the findings of a SCEEUS project and four separate reports in 2023. See: https://sceeus.se/en/publications/